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RESEARCHNOTES
An EmpiricalTestof theRational-Actor
Theoryof Litigation

Donald R. Songer
Universityof South Carolina

CharlesM. Cameron
ColumbiaUniversity

JeffreyA. Segal
State Universityof New Yorkat Stony Brook
This articleexaminesthe decisions of litigantsin criminalcases to appealdecisions from the U.S.
Courtsof Appealsto the U.S. SupremeCourt.Using a randomsampleof searchand seizurecases from
1962through1990and a measureof the likelihoodthatthe appealscourt decisionwill be reversedif cert
is granted,we demonstratethat litigantsbehaveas if they rationallyconsidercosts and benefitsin their
decisionsto appeal.Given the extraordinarynumberof cases decided by lower federalcourts vis-a-vis
the numberof cases the Supreme Court can decide, we argue that such behavioris necessaryif the
SupremeCourtis to retaincontrolover the federaljudiciary.

INTRODUCTION

Piitical scientists, economists,and sociologistshave studied many aspectsof decision makingin courts,includingthe decisionto initiatelitigation.The decisionto
continuelitigationthroughappeals,however,has all but been ignored.Such decisions are crucialto questionsof hierarchyand controlin the administrationof justice becausehighercourtscannotexercisecontrolover lowercourtsunless litigants
appeallower-courtdecisions that are divergentfrom upper-courtpreferences.In
the absenceof rationalbehaviorby litigants,lower courts will have little reasonto
fearbeing overturnedby a SupremeCourtthat receivesnearly5,000 cert petitions
per term (Segal and Spaeth 1993). Scholarsmay assumethat litigantsare rational,
but assumingthey are and demonstratingthey are are separatequestions.No empiricalworkto date has demonstratedsuch a claim.
An earlierversion of this articlewas presentedat the 1993 annualmeeting of the Law and Society
Association,Chicago. We gratefullyacknowledgethe support of NSF grant SES-9112755 and thank
Ashlyn Kuerstenand David Slovenskyfor their researchassistance.
THE JOURNALOF POLITICS,Vol. 57, No. 4, November 1995,Pp. 1119-29
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We provide a first attemptat filling this gap in the sociolegalliteratureby analyzing the decisions of litigantsto appealadversecriminaldecisions. We test the
hypotheses on a randomsample (n = 752) of decisions whether or not to appeal
U.S. Circuit Courtrulingsto the U.S. SupremeCourt in searchand seizurecases
from 1962through 1990.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

PreviousResearch
Althoughthe decisionto appealcases is not well studied, there areobvioussimilaritiesbetween the decision to appeala ruling and the decision to plea bargainin
criminalcases, and the decisions to bring and settle civil suits. In this section, we
brieflyreviewsome importantfindingsfromthe largeliteratureon suit, settlement,
and trial,highlightingpoints that cast light on appeals.
The locus classicusfor the analyticstudy of criminaltrialsis Landes's 1971article "An Economic Analysisof the Courts."Landes models a two-stage game of
completeinformationbetweena prosecutorand a criminaldefendant(we use contemporarygame theoretic terminologyto describe Landes's model). In the first
stage, the two actorsplea bargain,possiblyreachinga negotiatedsettlement.In the
second stage, the two actors simultaneouslyallocatelitigationeffort.' If the case
proceeds to trial, the probabilityof conviction depends on the litigation efforts
expended by both, as the "court"is representedby a smooth deterministicfunction. The sentencein the event of a convictionis commonknowledge.The prosecutor attempts to maximize the expected number of sentence-yearssubject to a
budget constraint.The defendantattemptsto maximizeutility, a decreasingfunction of litigationeffort and sentence,subjectto an effortconstraint.
Landes'smodel identifiedsome of the key elementsin any model of rationallitigant behavior,and we expect these same elements to play an importantrole in appeals decisions as well. These elements include "the probabilityof convictionby
trial,the severityof the crime, the availabilityof resourcesto each side, the relative
costs of a trial versus settlement,and attitudesregardingrisk"(Elder 1989, 193).
Empiricalstudies of settlementtend to confirmthe importanceof these factorsin
trial decisions,althoughthere is some ambiguityaboutthe effect of the severityof
penalties and little work has been conducted on the effect of prosecutorialcosts
(Elder 1989;Perloffand Rubinfeld1988;Danzon and Lillard 1983;Rhodes 1976).
Not only did the Landes model point to elementssuch as probabilityof conviction and the cost of litigation,it also uncoveredone of the fundamentalprinciples
of trialdecisions:if the two actorssharea commonperceptionof the probabilityof
conviction,then court costs driverisk-neutrallitigantsto reacha negotiatedsettlement.One of the centralpuzzlesin the literaturethus emerges:why aretheretrialswhy don't prosecutorsand defendantsalwayssettle out of court?Or, restatingthe
'Landes (1971) assumesthe prosecutormust allocatea budget of resourcesover his caseload,while
the defendantvaluesmoney spent on litigation.
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matter,under what circumstanceswill prosecutorsand defendantshave different
perceptionsof the probabilityof conviction?Obviously,the same puzzle appliesto
appeals,for if both sides sharea commonperceptionof the probabilityof successful appealthey will incorporatethis perceptionin their earlierdecisionto settle.
The workthat immediatelyfollowedLandes'sanalysisused ad hoc assumptions
to sidestep the puzzle of asymmetricperceptions.More recent work uses incomplete informationmodels from game theory to address the question directly. In
some of these models only the defendant knows for sure whether he or she is
guilty, so that settlementoffers allow prosecutorsto screen out guilty defendants
(Grossmanand Katz 1983).In others,the prosecutorhas privateinformationabout
the qualityof the case, so that settlementoffers signal to defendantswhetherthey
are likelyto be convicted(Reinganum1988).
These incomplete informationmodels are extremely elegant and logically appealing, but from an empiricalstandpointan obvious question is, do the predictions from such models differ substantiallyfrom those derived from the earlier
modelswith ad hoc assumptionsaboutasymmetricperceptions?Reinganum's1988
model (which representsthe contemporarystate-of-the-art)suggestsstronglythat
the factorsidentifiedby Landes retain their importance.For example, her model
predictsa positiverelationshipbetweenthe strengthof the case and the probability
of going to trial. The model also predictsthat increasesin the prosecutor'scost of
going to trialdecreasethe likelihoodof trial.Interestingly,in light of the empirical
evidence,the model suggeststhat the effect of the likelysentence given conviction
and the defendant'scost of trial are indeterminate.The latter predictionmay be
surprisingbut hinges on two conflictingeffects. As likely sentence and defendant
costs increase,the defendantis more likely to accept a given settlementoffer. But
those changesalso lead the prosecutorto offer toughersentences,which the defendant is less likely to accept. Hence the net effect depends on the relativemagnitudes of the two effects, an empiricalquestion.
Hypotheses
The lessons fromthe theoreticaland empiricalanalysesof settlementseem quite
clear.Rationallitigantsconsideringappealsto the SupremeCourt will surelyconsiderthe probabilityof winning,the severityof the crime, and the availabilityof resources.We considerthese in turn.
The probabilityof winning differsmarkedlyfor the defendantfacing trial from
the defendantseekingappealto the SupremeCourt.Whereasthe trial-courtdefendantconsideringa guilty plea (with or withouta negotiatedsettlement)has the absolute right to trial should he or she choose, the upper-courtdefendantdeciding
whetherto foregoappealis not guaranteedhis or her day in Court. The first step
in winning for the advancedappellate defendantis probablythe most difficult:
getting the Supreme Court to agree to hear the case. Only then will the case be
heard on the merits. Those factors that will make the Supreme Court (a) more
likelyto hearthe case and (b) morelikelyto rule in favorof the defendantif it hears
the case, should increasethe probabilityof appeal.
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We believe most if not all defendantsin our sampleface almostassuredconviction if the evidence under question is legally admissible.The greaterthe severity
of the crime, then, the greaterthe cost of being convicted and, presumably,the
greaterthe likelihoodthat the defendantshould appeal.Finally, poor defendants,
i.e., those with fewer resources,should have less ability to appealthan those who
arenot financiallychallenged.2
DATA AND METHODS

We test our predictionson decisionsmade by criminaldefendantsto appealadversesearchand seizurejudgmentsfroma randomsampleof such casesdecidedby
the United States Courts of Appeals with opinions (including per curiams)published in the FederalReporterfrom calendaryear 1961 through 1990.3The unit of
analysisis the search. In those few opinions that discussed the validityof several
unrelatedsearches,each searchwas coded separately.
To evaluatelitigantdecisionsto seek reviewof CircuitCourtdecisions,we need
a well-specifiedmodel of SupremeCourtdecisions. If litigants attempt to gauge,
amongother variables,their probabilityof successif grantedreview,they will need
to assess the strengthof their legal argumentsas those argumentsare likely to be
evaluated through the filter of the attitudinal predispositions of the current
SupremeCourtmajority.Such an assessmentrequirescarefulattentionto the facts
of their particularcase, an understandingof the importanceattachedto each of
those facts by the Supreme Court, and knowledgeof the attitudinalperspectives
of membersof the Court.To evaluatewhetherlitigantsbase their decisionsto seek
review on such an analysis,we need a model of Supreme Court decision making
that takes into accountboth the most importantcase facts and the changingattitudes on the Court.
To satisfythat requirement,we choose the searchand seizurecasesand the factpatternmodels developed there by Segal (1984; Segal and Spaeth 1993). To our
2In Cameron,Segal, and Songer (1993), we providea simple game-theoreticmodel of appealsdecisions without consideringincomplete informationin any detail. This model supports the above hypothesesfor defendants.There is greatercomplexityfor the government'sdecisionto appeal,however.
While the costs of appeal,which are higher for the states than for the nationalgovernment,lowers the
probabilityof appeal,and the importanceof the questionedevidenceincreasesthe probabilityof appeal,
other seeminglyintuitivevariables-for example,the probabilityof cert or even the relativelikelihood
of success ratherthan failurefrom the appeal-are actuallyambiguousin sign. Their sign dependson
the magnitudesof effects that tug in different directions.These variablescannot be used to test the
model with respectto the government.Other than noting that consistentwith our model, the national
government,for which appealingentails substantiallylower costs, appealsmuch more often than the
states, we focus our attentionon the decisionsby criminaldefendantsto appeal.
3Wefirstdeterminedthe populationof appealscourt search-and-seizurecases by searchingWestlaw
for all cases with the topic "searchesand seizures,"all Fourth Amendmentcases, criminallaw topics
219, 226, 364, 365, 394, and 207, plus severalrelevantcombinationsof key words.The list of casesgeneratedby these searcheswere put in a file, from which we took a stratifiedrandomsampleof 40 casesper
year.Any case fromour samplethat turnedout not to be a searchand seizurecase was replacedwith the
next listed case.For yearsin which fewerthan40 search-and-seizurecaseswere published,all published
cases were includedin the sample.

RationalActorTheory of Litigation

1123

knowledge, no fact-patternanalyses have performedas well as the search and
seizure models. Segal's model combinesan examinationof the place of the intrusion (e.g., home, business,car),the extent of the intrusion(full searchversuslesser
intrusion),the priorjustification(warrantand probablecause), and variousexceptions to the warrantrequirement(e.g., searchesincident to arrest)with a measure
of the attitudinalpreferencesof the Courtmajority.Using datathat add all search
and seizurecasesdecidedby the SupremeCourtthroughthe end of its 1990termto
the dataanalyzedin Segal'searlier(1984)work,a logit modelof the Court'sdecision
makingcategorized78% of the cases correctlywith a reductionin errorof 41%.
Any assessmentof SupremeCourtpreferencesover time must considerwhether
those preferenceshave changed,and how they have done so. Most systematicattemptsto measurechangeon the SupremeCourtor amongindividualjusticeshave
measuredthe percent of cases decided in a liberalor conservativedirectionover
time (e.g., Brenner and Arrington 1983; Ulmer 1973, 1979). Such designs have
much to tell scholars,but they attributeall change to the justicesand none to the
changingnatureof the cases (see Baum 1988for a notableexception).Fortunately,
we alreadycan control for case characteristics.To measurechange explicitly we
tested a varietyof models of how the Court'sdecisionshave changedin searchand
seizureaftercontrollingfor the factsof the case. We concludedthat the model suggesting the Court has become increasinglyconservativewith each passing term
since the adventof the BurgerCourtis superiorto plausiblealternatives.4The parameterestimate for the term variable,.0919, suggests a search that had a 50%
chance of being upheld in the 1968 term would have an 89% chanceof being upheld in the 1990 term. Our model therefore includes a measure of changing
Supreme Court policy orientationthat takes the value of 68 during the Warren
Court years and increasesby one for each successive year beginningwith the advent of the BurgerCourt.
The firststep in our analysiswas to determine,for eachcase in our sampleof appeals court cases, the probabilitythat the search at issue in the court of appeals
would be upheld if the appeals court decision were reviewed by the Supreme
Court. The coding rules employedby Segal (1984) were adoptedfor the coding of
each of the case facts in the model describedearlier.5Like Segal, we coded our
dependent variableas one if the court either found the challengedsearch to be
4Like Segal (1985), we find that models involvingchangingconstantsare superiorto models involving changingparametervaluesof the independentvariables.Of the modelswith changingconstants,the
one hypothesizingincreasingconservatismwith each term outperformedmodels hypothesizing(a) different constantsfor the Warren,Burger,and RehnquistCourts, and (b) models suggesting increased
conservatismfor each replacementof a WarrenCourt justice with a Nixon, Ford, Reagan,or Bush appointee. The chi-squarefor the term model was appropriatelylower (177.71 for the term model versus
179.81 for the appointmentmodel and 178.63 for the chief justice model), the percent predictedcorrectly was higher (77.95 versus 76.41 and 76.92), and the significancelevel of the change variablewas
lower (.0017 versus .0040 and .0029).
51t should be noted that like Segal we acceptedthe decision of the lower court as to whetheror not
subjectivelydeterminedfacts (e.g., whetheror not there was probablecause)were present.That is, we
coded case factsfrom the perspectiveof their statuspriorto the decisionof the appealscourts.
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reasonableor allowedthe evidenceobtainedfrom the searchto be used; if not, the
dependentvariablewas coded zero.
For each appealscourt case, the probabilitythat the searchwould be upheld by
the Supreme Court was computed using the parametervalues from the Supreme
Courtmodel. The log of the odds ratioof the probabilitythat the searchwill be upheld (Pi) can be expressedby an equationof the form:
log (

i'

=ar + Ifi3Xi

+ E

where each "X" is the case fact and attitudinalvariablesfrom the Supreme Court
search-and-seizuremodel, and the betas are the logit coefficientsfrom that model.
Substitutingthe actualvaluesfromthe SupremeCourtmodel, the followingequation was used to generatethe log of the odds ratioof the probabilitythat each appealscourt searchwould be upheld if reviewedby the SupremeCourt:
log (1 _'

) = -6.019 + 3.256 incident+ 1.049 afterlaw

+ -.06 unlawful+ -0.234 probcaus+ 1.928 warrant+ -3.25 home
+ -2.054 person+ -2.733 business+ -2.243 car + 1.411 except
+ -1.766 extent+ 0.878 US + 0.121 term
wherethe firstthreevariablesindicatewhetherthe searchwas incidentto or aftera
lawfulor unlawfularrest;the next two variablesindicatewhetherthe trialcourtdeterminedthat there was either probablecause for the searchor that the searchwas
conductedpursuantto a warrant;the next fourvariablesindicatethe locationof the
search(a home, person,business,or car comparedwith the referencecategoryof a
locationwithouta recognizedexpectationof privacy);the next variable(extent)indicateswhetherit was a full or limited search;the next variableindicateswhether
the United Stateswas the governmentdefendingthe validityof the search;and the
last variable(term)is an indicatorof the changingliberalismof the SupremeCourt.
Solving the equationfor the value of Pi(i.e., Pi = antilogPi / 1 + antilogPi) yields
an estimateof the probabilitythat the searchat issue in the court of appealswould
be upheldif reviewedby the SupremeCourt.This estimateof the searchbeing upheld (EST UPHELD) was then used in our empiricalmodel.
Next, we tested variablesaffectingthe likelihoodthat cert will be granted.The
leading explanationsof aggregatecert decisions involve two broad categories:
conflict(Ulmer 1984;Caldeiraand Wright 1988)and cues (e.g., Tanenhauset al.,
1963;Songer 1979;ArmstrongandJohnson 1982;Caldeiraand Wright 1988).The
role of conflictstems directlyfromthe SupremeCourt'srule 17, which specifically
lists conflict between lower appellatecourts or between the lower appellatecourt
and the Supreme Court as grounds for granting cert (Stern, Gressman, and
Shapiro 1986, 194). Fortunately,our previouslydefined EST UPHELD variable
already measures conflict between the lower-court decision and contemporary
SupremeCourtpreferences.We do not, though, have dataon whetherlower-court
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cases might conflict with other lower-courtcases. Nor do we know how, for our
sampleof cases, such datacould reliablyand validlybe measured.6
Of the cues tested by variousscholars,the most importanthas been whetherthe
United Statesfavorsreview.As our dataset consistsof cases wherecriminaldefendants lost at the relevantcourt of appeals,there are no cases in which the United
States favorsreview. Another cue, or perhapssignal, demonstratedto be of importanceis the existence of amicus briefs favoringor opposing review (Caldeira
and Wright 1988). The decision of groups to support or oppose review typically
comes after the appealis filed and thus cannot be a factor in the decision of litigants to seek review.7Two relevantcues from the Tanenhausstudy are whether
there was dissent in the appealscourt case (DISSENT) and whether the Circuit
Court overturnedthe trial court decision (OVERTURN) (see Tanenhaus et al.
1963 and Caldeiraand Wright 1988). These factors that make the Court more
likelyto hearthe case should thus makelitigantsmore likelyto appeal.
Measuringthe seriousnessof the crime is not a straightforwardtask. Some of
our petitionershavebeen convictedand sentenced,while othershave not yet faced
a trial. We proceed in what we consider to be a reasonablefashion under the
circumstancesby adding a variablethat measures the seriousness of the crime
(CRIME):3 = murderor other crimesof violence;2 = organizedcrime, drugs,or
bankrobbery;1 = other,includingtheft, tax evasion,white collar,conspiracy,perjury, gambling,immigration,and firearms.
Finally, we measurelitigantresourcesas a dummy variablecoded as one if the
litigantis poor and coded as zero otherwise(POOR). To the extent that poor litigants file without legal assistance,they are also extraordinarilymore likely not to
havetheirpetitionsgranted.Since our dependentvariableis dichotomous(1 = litigant sought review, 0 = litigantdid not seek review)we used logit to estimateour
model. EST UPHELD and POOR should be negativelyassociatedwith the decision to appeal,while DISSENT, OVERTURN, and CRIME should be positively
associatedwith the decisionto appeal.
RESULTS

Our data consist of 752 search-and-seizuredecisions renderedagainstcriminal
defendantsin the U.S. Courtsof Appeals.Of those 752 decisions, defendantsappealed312 (41.5%),incurringthe costs of appealagainstthe jointprobabilityof the
SupremeCourtgrantingcert and reversingthe ruling.
6We could measureallegationsof circuit court conflictfrom petitioners'briefs, but as Ulmer (1984)
demonstrates,such claimshave little to do with actualcircuitcourt conflict.
7McGuire(1993, 121-25) finds that seeking amici at the cert stage is not a frequentactivity of the
SupremeCourt bar, even among knowledgeableinsiders. And though he is not specific on this point,
the relevantsection in his book seems to indicatethat the amici-seekingactivitythat does exist follows
the decision to appeal.Moreover,to the extent that groups seek out cases to file briefs on, this occurs
aftercert is granted(125-26).
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TABLE 1
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF DEFENDANT APPEALS
Variable

M.L.E.

S.E.

Constant
EST UPHELD
DISSENT
REVERSE
POOR
CRIME

.46
-1.04**
.76**
-.36
-.32*
.06

.42
.42
.29
.32
.20
.13

n = 752
*p < .10; **p < .01.

= 16.05; p = .0067.
-2 x LLR = 1,004.55.
Mean of dependentvariable= .415.
Reductionin error = 8%.
x2

The coefficientsin table 1 show the changein the log of the odds ratiofor a decision by the losing litigant to seek Supreme Court review. The results demonstrate that litigants in these cases do respond, to a certain extent at least, to the
variablesderivedfromour model. Most importantis the variablethat measuresthe
estimatedprobabilitythatthe SupremeCourtwill upholdthe search.This variable
rangesin value from .10 to .9998. At the .01 significancelevel we can statethat litigants (presumablywith the advice of counsel) consider what the SupremeCourt
would do if it heardtheir case beforefiling appeals.The coefficient,-1.04, means
that a one standarddeviationincreasein the probabilityof the searchbeing upheld
decreasesthe probabilityof appealsby about .05 from a baselineof .50. A change
from the searchleast likely to be upheld to the searchmost likely to be upheld decreasesthe probabilityof an appealby .31.
A high conditional probabilityof having a decision overturned if cert were
granted would mean little to a defendant if there were virtuallyno chance that
cert would be granted.Thus, defendantsshould consider variablesrelatedto the
grantingof cert. First, we note that the variablemeasuringthe likelihoodthat a
grantedcase would be upheld (EST UPHELD) also influencesthe likelihoodthat
cert will be granted(Caldeiraand Wright 1988;Ulmer 1984), in that it measures
conflictwith contemporarySupremeCourt preferences.Moreover,dissent on the
Circuit Court, which signals the potential of a problematiccase to the Supreme
Court(Caldeiraand Wright 1988;Perry1991;Tanenhauset al. 1963;Ulmer 1984),
also increasesthe likelihoodof appeal.The coefficientfor the variablemeasuring
dissent, .76, means that a litigantundecidedaboutappealingin a case withoutdissent (p = .50) would havea .68 probabilityof appealingan exactlysimilarcase that
containeda dissent.
A second variablerelatedto the increasedlikelihoodof cert in the literature,reversal of a lower-courtdecision, is not significantlyrelated to filing an appealin
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these cases.One possibleexplanationis that litigantsdo not perceivethis to be relevant to the SupremeCourt'scert decisions.
Also failing to producepositive results is our measureof the seriousnessof the
crime. Althoughthe estimateis in the expecteddirection,the coefficientis approximatelyhalf the size of its standarderror.Apparently,those facing shorterprison
termsare no less likelyto appealthan those facinglife in prison.8
Finally, criminal defendantswho have fewer resourcesare slightly less likely
to appeal than those with greaterresources. The coefficient, -.32, means that
being poor decreasesthe probabilityof appealingby a modest .08 from a prior
baselineof .50. In some ways,poor litigantsmight be consideredmore likely to appeal, as they can appealin forma pauperis. But as those appealsare almost universally denied (Segal and Spaeth 1993, chap. 4), that option is virtuallyworthless.
The unwillingnessof most poor litigantsto availthemselvesof that option demonstratesthis.
Overall,our model is significantatp < .01. Nevertheless,it makesbut a modest
8% reductionin errorover a null model in which defendantsnever appealto the
SupremeCourt.Thus, we could hardlyclaimthat we haveuncoveredall, or even a
substantialproportion,of the factorsthat influenceappealsby criminaldefendants.
What we do show, though, is that whateverelse is involved, rationalbehavioris
also in evidence.Given thatthereis no otherworkin this area,eitherformalor empirical,we believe this is a worthwhilestart.
DISCUSSION

This articledemonstratesthat criminaldefendantsengagein seeminglyrational
behaviorin their decision whether to appeal adverse Circuit Court decisions to
the Supreme Court. In some sense, this finding is not terriblysurprising:many
analystsof courts assumethat the actorsin the processare instrumentallyrational.
Yet as Green and Shapiro(1994) note, rational-choicemodels need to be tested.
Of course, our resultsare limited in that we only examineone issue area:search
and seizure cases. Certainly,had we been able to find similar results across the
gamut of cases heard in federalcourts our results would have greaterscope. But
given the need to be able to predictexpectedSupremeCourtoutcomes,choosinga
specificsubjectareawas absolutelyessential.A globalmodel of appealswould requirea globalmodel of SupremeCourtdecisionmakingthat includedfact patterns
fromall the differenttypes of cases the Courthears.This cannotbe done, and thus
researchersmust fill in the gapsin a piecemealfashion.
Whether search-and-seizuredecisions are the best place to start may also be
questioned.We chose these cases becausein our opinion the SupremeCourtmodels developed there have more explanatorypower than the models developed in
otherareas.But that is not to say that search-and-seizurecases are unique in being
8Recognizingthe limits of our measure,we tried a series of alternativespecifications.None worked
any betterthan what we reporthere.
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explainableby fact patterns.Researchin capitalpunishment(George and Epstein
1992), obscenity (Hagle 1992; McGuire 1990), sex discrimination(Segal and
Reedy 1988;Wolpert 1991), and the establishmentclause cases (Ignagni 1990) all
demonstratethe robustnessof this approach.Of course we cannot claim rational
behaviorby litigantsin other areasof the law basedon our research,but one positive claim is a substantialimprovementon no positiveclaims.9
Our researchalso has importantimplicationsfor decision makingat the Courts
of Appealsandat the SupremeCourt.CircuitCourtresponsivenessto the Supreme
Court is alwaysquestionablein a world where the Supreme Court can only heara
small fractionof the cases appealedto it. Previousresearchhas demonstratedthat
rationalbehaviorby litigants,insofaras they appeallower-courtrulingsnot in line
with upper-courtpreferences,is a necessarycondition for hierarchicalcontrol in
the judiciary(Songer,Segal, and Cameron1994).We see here for the firsttime evidence of such behavior.
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